MOLDOVA AND THE US POLICY - 2. TRANSNISTRIA

Article Index
MOLDOVA AND THE US POLICY
2. TRANSNISTRIA
3. ECONOMY
4. FOREIGN POLICY
5. US POLICY
6. ENDNOTES
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TRANSNISTRIA


Conflict between Moldovan forces and those of the breakaway “Dniestr Republic” (a separatist entity proclaimed in 1990 by ethnic Russian local officials in the Transnistria region of Moldova) erupted in March 1992. Over 300 people died in the violence. A cease-fire was declared in July 1992 that provided for Russian, “Dniestr Republic,” and Moldovan peacekeepers to patrol a “security zone” between the two regions. Each of the peacekeeping contingents have roughly 400 personnel. They are overseen by a Joint Control Commission, which includes the three sides, as well as the OSCE as an observer.

The causes of the conflict are complex, involving ethnic factors and, above all, maneuvering for power and wealth among elite groups. Ethnic Russians and Ukrainians together make up 51% of Transnistria’s population of about 650,000, while Moldovans are the single largest ethnic group, at 40%.

Many analysts are convinced that a key factor obstructing a settlement is the personal interests of the leaders of the “Dniestr Republic” and associates in Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, who control the region’s economy. They also allegedly profit from illegal activities that take place in Transnistria, such as smuggling and human trafficking. The 2006 State Department human rights report sharply criticized the “poor” human rights record of the “Dniestr Republic,” noting its record of rigged elections, harassment of political opponents, independent media, many religious groups, and Romanian-speakers.

Negotiations over the degree of autonomy to be accorded the Transnistria region within Moldova have been stalled for many years.1 The two sides have negotiated over Transnistria’s status with the mediation of Russia, Ukraine and OSCE. In 2005, at the urging of Ukraine and Moldova, the United States and the European Union joined the talks as observers. This process resulted in proposals for a federal Moldova, in which Transnistria would have great autonomy. Nevertheless, Transnistrian leaders, apparently satisfied with the present state of affairs, blocked any agreement. In September 2006, Transnistria held a referendum on independence and union with Russia, which passed with 97% of the vote.

While stopping short of openly advocating independence for Transnistria, Russian officials have pointed to the possible independence of Kosovo from Serbia as a precedent for Transnistria. Russia has provided financial support to Transnistria, including grants and loans as well as subsidized energy. In return, Russian firms have received stakes in Transnistrian businesses.2 On the other hand, analysts say Russian leaders may be disenchanted with Transnistria “President” Igor Smirnov, particularly after he refused in 2007 to repay debts owed to the Russian state-owned natural gas firm Gazprom for natural gas supplies. However, if Moscow moves against Smirnov, it would likely be to substitute a more pliable replacement, not to abandon support for the separatist cause itself.



 

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

Declaratia "ferma" facuta de aliati cu privire la faptul ca Ucraina si Georgia vor deveni membre NATO este foarte clara si nu lasa loc de indoiala, a declarat, vineri, secretarul general al NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, precizand ca documentul marcheaza inceputul unui proces.